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Article 3

By Laura F. Rothstein*

Educational Rights of Severely and
Profoundly Handicapped Children
A person who is severely impaired never knows his hidden sources of
strength until he is treated like a normal human being and encouraged to
shape his own life.
-Helen Keller

I.

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, mentally and physically handicapped persons
have been treated as second-class citizens and hidden from society. After educational theorists recognized that most handicapped
persons could benefit from education,' the stage was set for opening the schoolhouse doors. Federal law now conditions the receipt
of federal funds by state school systems on the institution of a system of education that includes all handicapped children. 2 Even
today, however, it is estimated that of the approximately eight million handicapped children in the United States, about half are receiving little, if any, attention in the public schools. 3 One of the
most difficult problems in special education is educating profoundly retarded children. This is because it involves significant
financial resource commitments for personnel, overhead, and
Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University, B.A., 1971, University of
Kansas, J.D. 1974, Georgetown University; member Pennsylvania and Ohio
bars. The author has written and lectured extensively on legal rights of handicapped persons.
The author wishes to thank Ancil Ramey and Michele Widmer for their
research assistance, and H. Rutherford Turnbull Ill, Jan Sheldon-Wildgen,
and Richard J. Sobsey for their suggestions in developing the article.
1. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: PAST & PRESENT (1977); A. BLACKHURST & W. BERDiNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL EDUCATION (1981); M. HUTT & R. GIBBY, THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CHILD 386-91 (1976).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976) (conditions state's eligibility for federal assistance on
availability of free appropriate public education for handicapped children).
3. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(b) (1)-(4), 89 Stat. 774 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)). See also OFFICE OP EDUCATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PROGRESS TOWARD A FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC LAw 94142: THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT 16 (1979).
*
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other costs. This Article evaluates the legal requirement to educate profoundly retarded children and discusses the implications
of recent developments in this aspect of special education.
1. DEFINITION OF PROFOUNDLY RETARDED
The term profoundly handicapped is defined differently by legislators, courts, educators, and psychologists. In a symposium on
the education of profoundly retarded children, 4 extremely debilitated individuals were defined as those persons who function at
the extreme lower levels of cognitive attainment and adaptive behavior and who exhibit at least several of the following primary
characteristics:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

They have not acquired basic self-care skills.
They are permanently nonambulatory.
They are not known to many of the normal residents of their
communities.
They do not attend public schools unless the law explicitly requires
their enrollment.
They would have survived only a short time a few generations ago
but now have a life expectancy of decades due to modem medical
intervention.
They have been considered to be "untrainable" or "custodial" cases
until recently.
They show extremely little promise of becoming creative, productive
citizens even with5 the most heroic efforts of today's most skilled behavior therapists.

A more concise definition of severely or profoundly handicapped was developed by a psychologist, Baker, who found many
of the traditional definitions to be inadequate because they applied
only to persons of a particular age group or mental capacity. 6 "The
severely handicapped individual is one whose ability to provide for
his or her own basic life-sustaining and safety needs is so limited,
relative to the proficiency expected on the basis of chronological
4. SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATING THE SEVERELY & PROFOUNDLY HANDICAPPED,

1

Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities (1981) [hereinafter
referred to as SYMPOsrUM].
5. Kauffman, Symposium Editor'sIntroduction, SYMPosum, supra note 4, at 1-2.
6. Baker, Severely Handicapped.Toward An Inclusive Definition 4 A.A.E.S.P.H.
REV. 52 (1979). Probably the most frequently quoted traditional definition of
the severely handicapped by a psychologist is the following
[Severely handicapped persons are] those individuals age 21 and
younger who are functioning at a general developmental level of half
or less than the level which would be expected on the basis of chronological age and who manifest learning and/or behavior problems of
such a magnitude and significance that they require extensive structure in learning situations if their education needs are to be well
served.
Justen, Who Are the Severely Handicapped?: A Problem in Definition, 1
A.A.E.S.P.H. REV. 1, 5 (1976).
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age, that it could pose a serious threat to his or her survival." 7
Approximately one million children fall within the general category of profoundly handicapped. 8 In enacting the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHCA),9 Congress recognized that many of these children had never received any education through the public school system. This recognition caused
Congress to give higher priority to the needs of this segment of the
population. 0
The EHCA's mandated inclusion of profoundly handicapped
children in the public education system" was in response to litigation involving handicapped school children in the early seventies.
The following section reviews the significant case law developments in education both before And after passage of the EHCA.
III. OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW
A.

Constitutional Protections in the Area of Education

In Brown v. Board of Education,12 the Supreme Court stated
that whenever a state undertakes to provide education to any of its
citizens, it must do so on equal terms. In Brown, the Supreme
Court did not conclude that there is a fundamental right to education, but it did underscore the significance of public education in
modern American society.
[E ]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments .... It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities .... [I]t is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.... [Ilt is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is de7. Baker, supra note 6, at 60. See also infra note 41 for the New Jersey statutory
definition of profoundly retarded.
8. The number of children who fall under this classification varies depending on
who is applying what definition. In 1974, it was estimated that between
450,000 and 4,000,000 children fell within the category of severely or profoundly handicapped. See Kirp, Buss, & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special
Education: Empirical Studies and ProceduralProposals,62 CAL. L REv. 40,
42 n.7 (1974).
9. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142,89
Stat. 775 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as EHCAI.
In this Article, all references to the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1976 and supplements to date), will hereinafter be cited
as EHCA, unless otherwise noted. It is the EHCA, rather than the entire Education of the Handicapped Act, which is the focus of this Article.
10. Id. at § 1412(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a) (2) (1981). See also Hearingson the Educationfor All HandicappedChildrenAct Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
& Public Welfare, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975).
11. See supra note 2.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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nied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
provide it, is a right which must be made available
state has undertaken to
13
to all on equal terms.

Later, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez,14 the Court again had the opportunity to discuss equal protection in public education. The Court maintained its position that
education is not a fundamental right,15 while holding that unequal
expenditures of money in different school districts was not a denial of equal protection where the school finance allocation method
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.16
These two cases and other Supreme Court cases' 7 lead to the
conclusion that children in the public school system now have
broad constitutional protections, including the right to due process
in disciplinary proceedings and the first amendment right of free

speech.
B. Special Education
Two significant cases dealing specifically with the constitutional rights of handicapped children in the public schools are
PennsylvaniaAssociationfor Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania18 and Mills v. Board of Education.19
In PARC, a statute2 0 absolving the State Board of Education
from responsibility for educating untrainable or uneducable handicapped children was challenged by a class of parents and the
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children. The parties had
signed a consent agreement which outlined in great detail what
13. Id. at 493 (emphasis added). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
14. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In this case the public education was financed in part
through revenues from local property taxes, resulting in different per-pupil
expenditures in different school districts. The Court's holding that this was
not a denial of equal protection included the requirement that greater opportunities do not amount to a denial of equal protection where the state provides minimally adequateeducationalopportunitiesto all children. Id. at 4445. It should be noted that there is a difference between a minimally adequate education and no education.
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 54-55.
17. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), in which the Court outlined minimal
due process requirements to protect children in disciplinary proceedings,
and Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969),
which dealt with first amendment protections for students.
18. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED. Pa. 1971), affid and settlement approved, 343 F. Supp.
279 (ED. Pa. 1972).
19. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1375 (Purdon 1962). Other statutes challenged were
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1326, 13-1330(2), 13-1371(1), 13-1372(3), 13-1376
(Purdon 1962).
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the state would be required to do to fulfill its responsibilities. 21 The
court, in approving the consent agreement, decided that mentally
retarded children have a right to education.2 2 Shortly after the
PARC case, the Mills court decided that all handicapped children,
not just retarded children, have a right to an individually appropriate education. 23 These two cases established that handicapped
children have a right to due process before they can be excluded
from a program of public education 24 and a right to equal protection which prevents placement or exclusion decisions from being
made solely on the basis of their handicap. 25 Furthermore, the two
cases, in part, provided the impetus for the adoption of two major
federal statutes: the Rehabilitation Act of 197326 and the EHCA.27
21. 343 F. Supp. at 306. The order approved by the three judge panel provided
that the state and its educational agencies were enjoined from denying "to
any mentally retarded child access to a free public program of education and
training. . ." and the state and its agencies were ordered "to provide notice
and the opportunity for a hearing prior to a change in the educational status
of any child who is mentally retarded or thought to be mentally retarded
.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

." Id. at 302-303.

Id. at 315.
348 F. Supp. at 876.
343 F. Supp. at 298; 348 F. Supp. at 876.
343 F. Supp. at 299; 348 F. Supp. at 876.
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rehabilitation Act].
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976). See also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct
3034, 3044-45 (1982).
For general discussions of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, see H. TURNBULL &A. TURNBULL, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION:
LAW AND IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 1979); Alsehecler, Educationfor the Handicapped, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 523 (1978); Baugh, The FederalLegislation on Equal
Educational Opportunityfor the Handicapped, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 65 (1978);
Benjamin & Blair, Implementation of Education Laws Relating to Exceptional Children: The Maine Experience, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 449 (1977);
Blakely, Judicial and Legislative Attitudes Towards the Right to an Equal
Education for the Handicapped, 14 OHIO S.L. & Soc. PROB. 389 (1979);
Bulman &Moore, Jr., Recent Changes in the Law Affecting EducationalHearing Proceduresfor HandicappedChildren, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 41 (1977); Colley, The Educationfor all Handicapped Children Act (EHA): A Statutory
and Legal Analysis, 10 J.L. &EDUC. 137 (1981); Dittmeier &Menninger, Law
and Handicapped Persons: Achieving Equality Through New Rights, 47 J.
KAN. B.A. 181 (1978); Finn, Advocating for the Most MisunderstoodMinority:
Securing Compliancewith SpecialEducationLaws, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 505
(1980); Hagerty & Sacks, Educationof the Handicapped: Toward a Definition
of an AppropriateEducation, 50 TEmp. L.Q. 961 (1977); Hammond &Keenan,
The Institutionalized Child's Claim to Special Education: A Federal Codification of the Right to Treatment, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 337 (1979); Handel, The
Role of the Advocate in Securing the HandicappedChild's Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 OHIO S.L.J. 349 (1975); Krass, The Right to Public
Educationfor HandicappedChildren: A Primerfor the New Advocate, 1976
U. ILL. L.F. 1016 (1976); Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 213 (1980);
Levinson, The Right to a Minimally Adequate Educationfor Learning Dis-
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act makes it unlawful for any federally funded program or activity to discriminate against individuals on the basis of a handicap. 28 Similarly, the EHCA conditions
federal funding for certain state educational programs upon the
state's grant of a free appropriate
public education to all handi29
capped children of school age.
These federal laws have raised several issues, which have been
litigated repeatedly. 30 These issues include the following:
abled Children, 12 VAT. U.L. REV. 253 (1978); Miller & Miller, The Education
for All HandicappedAct How Well Does It Accomplish Its Goal of Promoting
the Least Restrictive Environment for Education? 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 321
(1979); Miller & Miller, The Handicapped Child's Civil Right as It Relates to
AppropriateMainstreaming,54 IND. L.J. 1 (1978); McClung & Pullin, Competency Testing and HandicappedStudents, 11 CLEARmNGHOUSE REV. 922 (1978);
Schoenfeld, Survey of the ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Retarded, 32
S.W. L.J. 605 (1978); Schroeder, Education of ExceptionalChildren: Act of 754
of 1977, 26 LA. B.J. 137 (1978); Shepherd, The Repudiation of Plato: A Lawyer's Guide to the EducationalRights of Handicapped Children, 13 U. RICH.
L. REv. 783 (1979); Stafford, Educationfor the Handicapped. A Senator'sPerspective, 3 VERMONT L. REV. 71 (1978); Weinstein, Education of Exceptional
Children, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 987 (1979); Comment, Educating New York's
Handicapped Children, 43 ALB. L. REV. 95 (1978).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (1976).
30. For a brief overview of the major areas of litigation, see generally Boundy,
Developments in Special Education, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1027-30 (1981);
Wallack, Recent Developments in Special EducationLaw, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 819-24 (1982). In addition to these substantive questions of controversy,
there are three major procedural questions under both the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. They
are: 1) whether there is a private right of action under the Act, 2) whether
there is a requirement to exhaust administrative remedies under the Act
before bringing a private action in court, and 3) what remedies are available
for a private litigant under the Act.
As to the private right of action issue, the generally applied analysis is a
four-pronged test set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1974). The four factors
are: 1) whether the statute was enacted to protect the individual seeking relief under it, 2) whether allowing a private action would frustrate the statute's
purpose, 3) whether a federal remedy is inappropriate because of pre-emption by the states, and 4) whether there is legislative intent regarding a private right of action. Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled explicitly
on this issue (see University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981);
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)), most jurisdictions have held that there is a private right of action under the Rehabilitation
Act. Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980) vacated
and remanded as moot, 101 S. Ct. 1830 (1981); Kling v. County of Los Angeles,
633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); Baker v. Bell, 630 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1980); Doe v.
Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979); Davis v. Southeastern Commun. College,
574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 397 (1979);
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp.
Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558
F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977). It would also appear that one need not exhaust ad-
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(1) What accommodations and modifications 31 are required under
the definition of related services? 32 (2) What procedures must be
ministrative remedies before bringing a private action under the Rehabilitation Act. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.
1981); Swan v. Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1980); Kling v. County of Los
Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980).
There is a split of authority regarding whether there is a private right of
action under the EHCA. It seems to be much more clear that one seeking
relief in the courts under the EHCA must do so as a review of the decision of
the state administrative agency. See, e.g.Ezratty v. Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, 648 F.2d 770 (1st Cir. 1981); Lombardi v. Ambach, 522 F. Supp. 867
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); H.R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215 (D. Md. 1981); Doe v.
Anrig, 500 F. Supp. 802 (D. Mass. 1980); contra Association for Retarded Citizens in Colorado v. Frazier, 517 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1981); Riley v. Ambach,
508 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Courts also seem reluctant to provide an
award of money damages under the EHCA. Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d
1205 (7th Cir. 1981); Lombardi v. Ambach, 522 F. Supp. 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981);
Hyatt, Litigatingthe Rights of HandicappedChildren to an AppropriateEducation: Proceduresand Remedies, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1981); Seng, Private
Rights of Action, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1117 (1978); Comment, Implications offa
Private Right of Action Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
73 N.W.U. L. REV. 772 (1978).
31. The major question in the area of accommodations and modifications involves administrative policies which limit instruction to a certain number of
days or hours in the day. In the recent decision of Battle v. Commonwealth,
629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 101 S. Ct. 3123 (1981), the Third Circuit
held that a state administrative policy of refusing to fund education in excess
of 180 days per year was invalid. The court held that the inflexible application
of this policy was incompatible with the EHCA's purpose. Accord, Georgia
Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 511 F. Supp. 1263, 1279 (N.D. Ga.
1981); Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp. 1256, 1266 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
Another case involving modifications under the EHCA involved a somewhat unique factual situation. In Espino v. Besterro, 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.
Tex. 1981), a school age child who could not adequately regulate his body
temperature sought to have the school provide an air-conditioned classroom
in which he could interact fully with his classmates. The court granted a preliminary injunction and thereby required that the school district provide an
air-conditioned environment wherein he could fully interact with his peers,
and enjoined the school from segregating the boy by requiring him to attend
class in an air-conditioned cubicle or in any other segregated environment.
Id. at 914.
32. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. The EHCA defines related services
as:

transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and
medical and counseling services, except that such medical services
shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of
handicapping conditions in children.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976).
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followed in disciplining special education students?3 3 (3) What
remedies are available for failure to comply with the statutory requirements of the two acts?34 (4) To what extent may testing be
For New Jersey's interpretation of related services, see Levine v. Institution & Agencies Dept. of N.J., 84 N.J. 234, 264-65, 418 A.2d 229, 245 (1980).
The two most frequently litigated issues of related services seem to involve the provision of sign language interpreters to deaf students and the provision of catheterization.
In Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the Supreme Court held
that a deaf child did not have a right to a sign langhage interpreter where the
child's existing support services permitted the child to benefit from the educational program. Id. at 3052. The holding in the case is limited to the particular facts presented to the Court.
A number of jurisdictions have dealt with the question of catheterization,
and the courts appear to be fairly consistent in holding that catheterization is
a related service required under the EHCA. It should be noted that catheterization can be performed by a professional nurse and without the service,
some children would not be able to attend school in the regular classroom.
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981); Tatro v. State,
516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.
W. Va. 1976).
33. Expulsion of a student or other removal of a child from the educational placement constitutes a change in placement and requires that appropriate due
process procedures be applied. A due process hearing is required to determine whether the misconduct is a manifestation of the handicap as well as
other issues. Expulsion for a few days may be permissible where there is a
threat to health or safety or where there is a substantial disruption in the
classroom, but due process procedures must be implemented as soon as possible. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1981); Pratt v. Board of Educ. of
Frederick County, 501 F. Supp. 232 (D. Md. 1980); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp.
225 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978); Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex.
1978).
34. The question of liability for failure to comply with the mandates of the EHCA
(sometimes referred to as educational malpractice) and of the remedies for
persons aggrieved by the failure of a school system to provide appropriate
education, is extremely complex and has been the subject of much debate.
The issues which must be resolved within this question include whether
there is a private right of action under state or federal law against public
schools, whether sovereign immunity protects the schools against suit under
state or federal law, and what kind of remedy is possible under either state or
federal law (i.e. can a successful plaintiff obtain damages or compensatory
education, or is relief only prospective). Some cases which have dealt with
some of these issues include Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ. of
Mass., 655 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1981); Jaworski v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents,
530 F. Supp. 60 (D.R.I. 1981); Hines v. Pitt County Board of Educ., 497 F. Supp.
403 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Hark v. School District of Philadelphia, 505 F. Supp. 727
(E.D. Pa. 1980); Miener v. State of Missouri, 498 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Mo. 1980);
Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121,424 N.Y.S.2d
376, 400 N.E.2d 317 (1979); Hunter v. Montgomery County Board of Education,
47 Md. App. 709, 425 A.2d 681 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); D.S.W. v. Fairbanks
North Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alas. 1981). For an excellent
discussion of the problem of providing a remedy for those injured as a result
of wrongful classification, see Comment, Legal Remediesfor the Misclassifica-
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used as a means of placing special students? 35 and (5) To what
extent are the expenses from placement of special students in resi36
dential settings reimbursed to the parents of the children?
It is the last issue of these major areas of controversy which
was the subject of a recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court. This case will be discussed in the following section.
tion or Wrongful Placement of Educationally Handicapped Children, 14
COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 389 (1979). See also Elson, A Common Law Remedy
for EducationalHarmsCaused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 N.W.
U.L. REv. 641, 693-768 (1978); Comment, DamagesActions for Denialof Equal
EducationalOpportunities,45 Mo. L. REv. 281 (1980).
35. The major case on the validity of testing, particularly IQ testing, as a means
of placing children in special education classes is Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F.
Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979). In that case the use of IQ tests was challenged as
having a disproportionate impact on black children. Although only 10 percent
of the general student population in California are black, approximately 25
percent of the students in the class for the educable mentally retarded are
black. The present status of this class action by black students challenging
the test as being in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1974, and the
fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, is that the use of intelligence
tests for placement purposes has been enjoined until it can be shown that a
particular test is not discriminatory or administered in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 989-990. See also, Parents in Action on Special Educ. (PASE) v.
Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Note, Classificationof the Educable
Mentally Retarded by Intelligence Testing: A DiscriminatoryEffect, 30 CATH.
U.L. REV. 335 (1981).
36. See infra notes 45-46 & 78-85 and accompanying text. The issues which arise
in regard to placement in residential facilities include: whether the entire
residential placement must be paid for entirely at the expense of the school
district (see Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1981); North v. District of Columbia Board of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C.
1979)); which school district is financially responsible for a residential placement (see Doe v. Kingery, 157 W. Va. 667, 203 S.E.2d 358 (1974); In re G.H., 218
N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974)); and how to determine the appropriate measure of
compensation for education where residential placement is required for
other than educational purposes (see Levine v. Institution & Agencies Dept.
of New Jersey, 84 N.J. 234, 255, 280, 418 A.2d 229, 240, 254 (1980)).
Another complex issue currently being considered is the constitutionality
of a state statutory ceiling on tuition reimbursement for private school placement. Halderman v. Pittenger, 391 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The problem
in the Pennsylvania statutory scheme is that a child could be placed in a private residential setting as the only appropriate placement, and if the cost of
the private placement is more than the statutory ceiling, the parents could be
obligated to pay the excess charges, which in the case of private schools
might be extremely high.
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IV. EDUCATION OF PROFOUNDLY RETARDED CHILDREN
A.

Recent Cases
1.

The Levine and Guempel Cases
a. Background

In Levine v. Institution & Agencies Departmentof New Jersey,37
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that under state law certain
profoundly retarded children may be uneducable and therefore
the state education system is not required to pay the costs of institutional care and maintenance. 38 The court did not decide whether
the EHCA or the Rehabilitation Act provides remedial relief; the
court remanded this issue for decision by the appropriate adminis39
trative agencies.
Nine year old Maxwell Levine was apparently brain damaged
from birth, and had been placed in the nursery unit of North
Jersey Training School, a state institution for mentally retarded
persons who are at least five years old. Maxwell was confined to a
crib and was classified as profoundly retarded with an IQ of ap40
proximately one.
The other plaintiff, Linda Guempel, was a nineteen year old retarded woman, who resided at Hunterdon State School. After a
short period at home as an infant, Linda was placed in a residential
school for the mentally impaired and five years later was placed in
Hunterdon. At that time she was evaluated as being profoundly
retarded based on cognitive and adaptive skills tests.4 ' Linda also
37. 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980) (consolidated case of Levine v. State Dept. of
Institutions & Agencies, 160 N.J. Super. 591, 390 A.2d 699 (App. Div. 1978) and
Guempel v. State, 159 N.J. Super. 166, 387 A.2d 399 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978)).
For other cases in which courts have dealt with the allocation of costs in residential placement situations, see Matthews v. Campbell, 3 EDUC. FOR THE
HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CCR) 551:264 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979); Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977); Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded
Children & Adults v. Essex; 411 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Ohio 1976); Halderman v.
Pittenger, 391 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re Richard G., 52 A.D.2d 924, 383
N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); In re Saberg, 87 Misc. 2d 848, 386 N.Y.S.2d
592 (Family Ct. 1976). Matthews v. Campbell, supra, is somewhat similar to
Levine, supra, in that Matthews involved a severely retarded child who was
placed by the court in a residential setting at public expense. The court in so
doing expressed concern that it was not optimistic about the ability of the
child to be trained under any circumstances. 3 EDUC.FOR THE HANDICAPPED
L. REP. (CRR) 551: at 266.
38. 84 N.J. at 255, 418 A.2d at 240.
39. Id. at 264, 418 A.2d at 245.
40. Id. at 241, 418 A.2d at 232.
41. Id. at 240, 418 A.2d at 232. In defining severely and profoundly retarded, the
New Jersey statutes use a functional definition, i.e., a definition as to what
these children can do rather than what they are. "[These subtrainable children] are ... so severely mentally retarded as to be incapable of giving evi-
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exhibited severe behavioral problems. Against this backdrop, the
court found that her school curriculum "emphasize[d] development of body awareness, sensorimotor skills and rudimentary selfcare skills such as eating, toileting, grooming and dressing."42
The parents of both Levine and Guempel claimed that the state
statutory scheme denied their children the right to a free public
education, as guaranteed by the state constitution, by not allowing
certain maintenance expenses to be included as education expenses. 43 But the supreme court said that persons like Levine and
Guempel who are placed in state institutions must be supported
44
be certain designated relatives with sufficient financial ability.
Only those expenses that fall under the classification, "educational
expenses," are to be paid for by the state education system. 4 5 For
Linda Guempel's parents, this amounted to $309.68 in 1978; the
Levines received a comparable credit. 46
b.

The Levine Decision
(i.) New Jersey ConstitutionalRequirements

The New Jersey Constitution guarantees a right to an education
by requiring that the legislature provide a "thorough and efficient
system of free public schools." 47 In Levine, the court concluded

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

dence of understanding and responding in a positive manner to simple
directions expressed in the child's primary mode of communication and who
cannot in some manner express basic wants and needs." Id. at 253, 418 A.2d
at 239 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A.46-9(c) (West 1981)).
84 NJ. at 240, 418 A.2d at 232.
Id. at 244, 418 A.2d at 234.
Id. at 242-43, 418 A.2d at 233-34.
Id. at 242-43, 418 A.2d at 233.
Id. at 266 n.19, 418 A.2d at 246 n.19.
Id. at 244, 418 A.2d at 234-35 (citing N.J. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4, par. 1 (1947)). If
the EHCA were to be repealed such that state constitutional and statutory
rights to education were to be the sole consideration, it would be important to
know what each state provides. State constitutions similar to the New Jersey
provision requiring a "thorough and efficient" school system are the following- ARK. CONsT. art. XIV, § 1; DEL. CoNsT. art. X, § 1; ILI_ CONST. art. X, § 1;
Ky. CONST. § 183; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA. CONST.
art. I, § 14; TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1; W. VA. CONsT. art. XII, § 1. State constitutions providing for "thorough and uniform" or "general and uniform" types
of school systems are the following. AzIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; COLO. CONST.
art. IX, § 2; FLA. CONsT. art. IXU,§ 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX § 1; IND. CONST. art.
8, § 1; KAN. CONsT. art. 6, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 11,
§ 2; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2;
ORE. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; UTAH CONsT. art. 10, § 1;
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; Wisc. CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo. CONsT. art. VII, § 1.
State constitutions whose provisions include language such as requiring a
"general diffusion of knowledge as essential to the preservation of rights and
liberties" are the following: CAL. CONsT. art. IX, § 1; MAnE CONsT. art. VII,
§ 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2, art. 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Mo. CONST.
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that the purpose of education is "to equip a child for his role as a
citizen and as a competitor in the labor market,"4 8 and to prepare a
child to "function politically, economically and socially in a democratic society."49 The court then used this standard in interpreting
the free education clause to not guarantee payment of the residential costs of total habilitation programs for profoundly retarded institutionalized children because habilitation is not education.5 O
The court seemed to go even further, however, and implicity held
that certain children may be so severely mentally impaired or retarded that they are unable to benefit from education, and therefore some children might conceivably not be entitled to any
reimbursement for educational expenses.5'
(ii.)

New Jersey Statutory Requirements

The New Jersey statutes relating to residential placement of
profoundly retarded children require the maintenance costs to be
borne by close relatives who are financially able.52 Conversely,
families of children receiving non-residential day care are not required to pay anything for the day care program.53 The parents of
Levine and Guempel challenged this differential treatment on
state and federal equal protection grounds, arguing that the disparate treatment between institutionalized and non-institutionalized
54
mentally retarded children was invidious discrimination.
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the disparate

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

art. IX, § 1(a); N.H. CONST. pt. U, art. 83; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1. State constitutions requiring education to be provided with "openness," "equality," or
"liberty" are the following: ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art.
VII, § 1; CONN.CONST. art. 8, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 12; MONT.CONST. art.
X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; OKLA.CONST. art. I,
§ 5; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. Other state constitutions
require as follows: GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("adequate education for the citizens"); HAWAI CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("statewide system of public schools"); LA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("education of the people"); Miss. CONST. art. 8, § 201
("legislature may... provide for.., schools for all children.. ."); TENN.
CONST. art. XI, § 12 ("recognizes the inherent value of education and encourages its support"); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68 ("a competent number of schools
ought to be maintained").
84 N.J. at 247, 418 A.2d at 235-36 (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303
A.2d 273, 295 (1973)).
84 N.J. at 247, 418 A.2d at 235-36, (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 18&-7A-4 (West
1981)).
Id. at 248-49, 418 A.2d at 236.
Id. at 250-55, 418 A-2d at 237-40. See also Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded
Children & Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46, 52 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
84 N.J. at 242, 263, 418 A.2d at 233, 244 (citing N.J. STAT. AiN. § 30:4-66 (West
1981)).
Id. at 255, 418 A.2d at 240.
Id.
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treatment was constitutionally permissible. 55 The underpinning of
the court's conclusion was that no fundamental right was involved 6 and persons afflicted with mental impairments do not constitute a suspect class. Thus, the differentiation between
institutionalized and non-institutionalized mentally retarded children could be upheld if there was a rational relationship between
the discriminatory funding of educational services and the purpose
of the state policy restricting educational funding for institutionalized children.5 7 One of the goals of the state's statutory scheme
was to enable children "to become responsible and effectively
functioning adults."5 8 The court held that the funding program
59
bore a rational relationship to that goal.
(iii.)

FederalRequirements

The state funding scheme in Levine withstood attack on federal
constitutional grounds because the scheme was rationally related
to a legitimate state objective. However, the New Jersey Supreme
Court did not decide the right to relief under any of the relevant
federal statutes. A determination as to compliance with the Rehabilitation Act60 was left to the appropriate administrative agencies. 61 The court did indicate that the existing state statutory
scheme for funding the education of institutionalized mentally impaired students may not be in compliance with requirements imposed by the EHCA. But the court did not go so far as to hold that
compliance with federal statutory and regulatory requirements required the payment of the entire cost of institutionalization, including room and board for institutionalized mentally impaired
2
children.6
55. Id. at 263, 418 A.2d at 244.
56. Id. at 258, 418 A.2d at 241-42. The court noted that education is not a fundamental right under the federal constitution (citing San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)) and that although the New
Jersey Constitution guarantees a right to a free education, habilitation is not
included within that constitutional guarantee. See also New Jersey Ass'n for
Retarded Citizens v. Dept. of Human Services, 89 N.J. 234, 445 A.2d 704 (1982).
57. 84 N.J. at 261, 418 A.2d at 243.
58. Id.

59. Id. at 263, 418 A.2d at 244. This same rationale was used by the New York
Court of Appeals in upholding the constitutionality of section 234 of the New
York Family Court Act which requires parents of handicapped children
(other than blind and deaf children) to pay some of the maintenance cost at
residential facilities, while blind and deaf children were not required to pay
maintenance costs. In re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 345 N.E.2d 556
(1976).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1976). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
61. 84 N.J. at 263-68, 418 A.2d at 245-47.
62. Id.
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c. Analysis of the Levine Decision
(i.)

New Jersey ConstitutionalRequirements

Although the New Jersey Constitution guarantees a free education,63 it does not define the word education. In Levine, the New
Jersey Supreme Court said that the meaning of "education" in the
state constitution could not be determined by an historical explanation 64 and instead, relied primarily on judicial interpretations
and state legislative definitions. 65 From these sources the court
determined that citizenship and the importance of carrying out the
66
duties of citizenship were the purposes of free public education.
This would imply that to have a constitutional right to free public
education in New Jersey, the person must have the potential of
learning to vote, or at least, of learning to function with some degree of independence in society.
There are several problems with this standard. First, it is difficult to predict whether a particular child has the ability to carry
out the ordinary duties of citizenship, such as voting. The court
does not state the age at which such a prediction should be made.
Second, the court does not enumerate those safeguards which
should be required to ensure that the prediction is valid, or those
safeguards which should be required to monitor changes in the potential of a particular child. This is the problem of the self-fulfilling
prophecy. If a child is determined to be "uneducable" within the
court's view, the child will probably be placed in a program where
any hidden potential will never be realized.67 Third, the court does
not take into account the potential for changes in teaching technology which might permit the education of children previously determined to be uneducable. A final problem with the Levine court's
definition of education is that it fails to recognize any definitions or'
functions of education beyond those which prepare a person to
vote or to become economically self-sufficient. On the other hand,
educators and psychologists generally include within the functions
of education the development of skills, such as, learning self-care;
not detracting from the health, well being, and comfort of others;
making positive economic and social contributions, and similar
68
goals.
63. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, par. 1 (1947).

64. 84 N.J. at 244-45, 418 A.2d at 234-35.
65. Id. at 245-48, 418 A.2d at 235-36.
66. Id. at 245-54, 418 A.2d at 235-40.
67. See generally, G. RIVERA, WnLowBRooK: A REPORT ON How IT IS & WHY IT
DOESN'T HAVE TO BE THAT WAY (1972); W. WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN &
NATURE OF OUR INSTITUTIONAL MODELS (1975).

68. Hawkins & Hawkins, ParentalObservations on the Education of Severely RetardedChildren: CanIt Be Done In the Classroom?,SYosluM, supra note 4,
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New Jersey Statutory Requirements

As previously discussed,69 the New Jersey statute which requires relatives of an institutionalized profoundly retarded child to
bear the costs of habilitation,70 withstood constitutional attack on
equal protection grounds in Levine.71 The major problem with this
result is, again,72 the failure of the court to take into consideration
all of the functions and purposes of a free public education when
determining the rights thereto.
(iii.)

FederalRequirements

The premise of the EHCA is that all children are educable7 3 and
that a state must provide free appropriate public education to all
children of school age in order to receive funds under the Act.7 4
New Jersey was receiving EHCA funds when the Levine case was

69.

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

at 13, 15. See discussion in text at sections IV(B) (1), (2) infra for the definition of "education." See generally, H. GROSSMAN, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY &
CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION (1977); Luckey & Addison, Profoundly Retarded: A New Challenge For Public Education, 9 EDUC. & TRAINING OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 123-30 (1974).
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 84 N.J. 258, 418 A.2d at 242. For
a discussion of the constitutional right to education, see Dimond, The Quiet
Revolution, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 1087 (1973). For a discussion of the equal protection clause as applied in the Levine case, see Note, Mentally Retarded
Children, 17 J. FAMILY L. 598 (1979).
84 N.J. at 259, 418 A.2d at 242. See supra note 52.
The decision in this case can be compared to that in In Re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653,
382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 345 N.E.2d 556 (1976), which upheld a New York City provision requiring parents of handicapped children, other than children who are
blind or deaf, to assist in payment for residential placement. The court found
that the distinction did not reflect invidious discrimination and the class of
non-blind/non-deaf handicapped children did not constitute a suspect classification.
Advocates for education for the handicapped should consider carefully
the benefits of arguing that unequal expenditures for different groups of
handicapped children is a violation of constitutional equal protection guarantees. Such an argument may fail to recognize the different costs involved in
educating children with different handicaps. For example, should it be argued that the amount spent on educating a child with a learning disability
should equal in dollars what is spent on educating a child with a hearing impairment. A second strategic problem with this argument is that the courts
might respond by disallowing the maintenance costs to the blind and deaf
children in Levy, certainly an undesirable result. See generally, Frederick L
v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
See supra note 2. "In order to qualify for assistance under this subchapter in
any fiscal year, a State shall demonstrate ... that ... the State has in effect
a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate
public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976).
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decided 5 and thus, was required to provide an education to all
children, even those who were profoundly retarded. The question
then becomes what must the state actually provide in its educational program in order to comply with federal law.
The Levine court reserved ruling and remanded the question of
whether the plaintiffs were entitled to relief under the Rehabilitation Act or the EHCA.76 The court said "this issue necessarily implicates the threshold question of whether plaintiffs are entitled to
credit] from the State under the appli[a] greater [educational
77
cable state laws."
The educational credit determined by the trial court was calculated by adding together the costs of salaries paid to certified
teachers, teacher fringe benefits, and educational supplies and
equipment used at the institution, and dividing that amount by the
number of students in the institution to arrive at the per capita
educational cost.7 8 The Levine court questioned whether this calculation included all of the pertinent educational expenses which
the state was required by law to pay.79 Indeed, no provision had
been made for such common public education expenses as building cost and overhead, and salaries paid to other professional and
non-professional personnel at the institution, e.g., secretaries, and
speech and hearing therapists.8 0 These sorts of expenses are commonly paid by the state as costs associated with public education.
Moreover, the cost of "related services" which must be provided to
handicapped children as part of their "free appropriate public education" was not included.81
84 N.J. at 263-66; 418 A.2d at 245-46.
Id. at 264; 418 A.2d at 245.
Id.
Id. at 243 n.3; 418 A.2d at 233 n.3.
Id. at 266; 418 A.2d at 245-46.
Id. at 278; 418 A.2d at 252. See also Brief for Amicus Curiae New Jersey Association for Retarded Citizens at 14-19, Levine v. Institution & Agencies Dept.
of New Jersey, 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980).
81. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The EHCA specifically provides
that special education paid for at public expense to all school age children
shall include related services such as necessary developmental, corrective
and supportive services, speech pathology, psychological services, physical
and occupational therapy, counseling, and diagnostic medical services. 20
U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1981). Therefore, in calculating the
cost of "education" for students in residential institutions, the court did not
include these "related services" costs which are statutorily included within
the "free appropriate public education" to be provided to all school age children. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.4 (1981).
At least one advocate in the Levine supreme court proceedings argued
that the amount allocated to education in computing the parents' liability
should be determined by setting the per capita cost of day training programs
operated by the New Jersey Division of Mental Retardation as being the pre75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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The regulations promulgated pursuant to the EHCA provide
that "[i]f placement in a public or private residential program is
necessary to provide special education and related services to a
handicapped child, the program, including non-medical care and
room and board, must be at no cost to the parents of the child."82
Cases interpreting this requirement have differentiated between
residential placement which is necessary for educational purposes
and that which is in response to medical, social, or emotional
problems that can be separated from the learning process. 83 In at
least one case, 84 the court, unable to distinguish between placement necessary for educational purposes and placement necessary
for medical, social, or emotional reasons, held that it was impossible to separate the emotional and educational needs in complex
cases and ordered residential placement, "with necessary psychiatric, psychological and medical support and supervision.... ."85
After having been requested by the child's representatives, the
burden of proving that residential placement is not necessary for
sumptive value of an education at either of the residential institutions involved. Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Public Advocate at 41-48,
Levine v. Institution & Agencies Dept. of New Jersey, 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229
(1980). The Public Advocate's arguments are based on considerations of public policy and fairness whereby the party with the means of disproving the
presumed fact should be placed in the position of rebutting the presumption.

Id.

82.
83.

84.

85.

Although this proposal may be an inappropriate means of determining the
proper amount of money which should be allocated to education, it seems
clear that the method of allocation used by the Division of Mental Retardation (whereby only about $310 was allocated per capita in residential placements) does not provide an appropriate measure when compared to the
educational costs being paid for day programs (approximately $5500 per
capita).
34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1981); 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (4) (B) (1976).
Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981). This
case involved a retarded 13 year old with almost no self-help skdlls, whose
parents sought placement in a residential program. The court concluded that
a full-time residential program was required to provide the necessary degree
of consistency for the child to receive a "free appropriate public education"
under the EHCA. The court noted that the language and legislative history of
the EHCA support the premise that all children are subject to the Act. The
Third Circuit used the term "trainable" in noting that the EHCA requires
residential placement for "training." Id. at 695. See also Tatro v. Texas, 625
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980); Gladys J. v. Pearland Independent School Dist., 520 F.
Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974); Doe v. Kingery, 157 W. Va. 667, 203 S.E.2d 358 (1974).
North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979). The
North case involved a 16 year old epileptic child whose residential placement
was directed to be paid for by the school district because the social, emotional, medical, and educational problems were so intertwined that the court
could not separate them.
Id. at 141-42.
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educational purposes will rest on the public agency.8 6 For example, in the Levine case, the parents of both Levine and Guempel
could have requested that the school district place their children in
a residential program, rather than doing so on their own initiative
and later seeking reimbursement for the habilitation costs. This
strategy has at least two distinct advantages. First, if the school
district determines that residential placement is necessary for educational purposes, the total cost of the residential placement
87
should be paid at public expense through the education budget.
Conversely, if it is determined that residential placement is not
necessary for educational purposes, the school system will still be
obligated to pay educational costs, including the costs of related
services. 88 Second, in the event that the request to have the children placed in the residential89program is denied, procedural requirements must be followed.
In summary, the Levine case illustrates judicial hesitancy to set
social policy in an area of the law where Congress and many state
legislatures have already spoken. The New Jersey Supreme Court
was unwilling to expand the right to a free appropriate public education without the benefit of the considered opinions of the administrative agencies most familiar with the education of handicapped
children. Thus, a decisive issue in the case was remanded for appropriate action.
2. The Matthews and Cuyahoga County Cases
In Matthews v. Campbell,90 the problem of residential placement of a profoundly handicapped child was again before a court.
The child had initially been placed in an elementary school but
little meaningful progress in the child's education resulted. Reluctantly, the court then ordered residential placement without cost
to,the plaintiff. 91 The opinion said that "[n] either the language of
the [EHCA] nor the legislative history appears to contemplate the
possibility that certain children may simply be untrainable.
Should the Court ultimately conclude that... [the] plaintiff is not
86. Laura M. v. Special School District, 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED I. REP.
(CRR) 552: 152, 155 (D. Minn. Jan. 21, 1980); see also Board of Education v.
Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3044-45 (1982); Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F.
Supp. 866, 881, (D.D.C. 1972); but see, Rowley v. Board of Education, 632 F.2d
945, 948 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
87. See 300 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1981).
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text. See
also 84 N.J. at 268 n.20, 418 A.2d at 247 n.20.
90. 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED I REP. (CRR) 551"264 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979).
91. Id. at 266, slip op. at 5-6.
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trainable, what options are then available." 92
In Cuyahoga County Association for Retarded Children &
Adults v. Essex,93 the federal district court for the Northern District of Ohio determined the constitutionality of Ohio statutes
which classify children for purposes of access to public education.
The court said that the classification was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose 94 but, nevertheless, held that the regulations governing the procedure for classification and placement
95
were unconstitutional because they lacked adequate safeguards.
Implicitly, the court also held that mentally retarded children who
through appropriate procedures were found to be incapable of ben96
efiting from education, had no constitutional right to education.
In regard to funding, the court said:
While the Court may well agree with plaintiffs that sufficient funding
should be procured so all persons suffering from mental disability can be
given as much training as would be of benefit to them, or that the resources available should be used in whatever proportions necessary to
reach all persons in need of training, this Court cannot substitute its judgement for that of the Ohio legislature in determining
the manner in which
97
this social welfare program is best administered.

Apparently this case was commenced prior to the enactment of
the EHCA, and therefore the court did not address the issue of the
right to education under the federal statute.
3.

Implications of the Recent Cases

The three cases highlighted in sub-section A all illustrate the
difficult decisions courts are facing in regard to the education of
profoundly handicapped children. Rights exist under both federal
and state law. The EHCA requires that profoundly retarded children be provided with a free appropriate public education, even if
it requires residential placement. 9 8 For example, on remand in Le92. Id.
93. 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
94. Id. at 52. This classification disqualified a child from the public education
system if determined to be "incapable of profiting substantially from further
instruction." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.05 (Page 1972) (repealed 1976).
The current statute provides that "[t]he State Board of Education shall establish standards for special education and related services for all handicapped children in the state, regardless of the severity of their handicap."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.02 (Page 1980).
95. 411 F. Supp. at 57-58. The invalid regulations were promulgated by the Ohio
Department of Education and the Ohio Department of Mental Health and
governed placement of students in special education classes, exclusion of
students from the compulsory public school system, and exclusion of individuals from training programs.
96. Id. at 59.
97. Id. at 57.
98. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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vine, the administrative agencies will probably determine that a
$310 education credit is insufficient, which means more tax dollars
will have to be spent. This raises the truly significant issues underlying these cases: How can limited financial resources be fairly
apportioned when the cost of a profoundly handicapped student's
education is so much more expensive to provide on a per capita
basis? Are these children really educable or has a category of governmental expenditures been misclassified for political expediency? Politicians realize that taxpayers are generally more
receptive to having their money spent on education rather than social programs. Can we legally, and morally, ignore the educational
rights of this class of citizens?
Presently, the EHCA protects a practically helpless class. It is
premised on the notion that all children are educable and defines
those services which properly fall under the rubric, "free appropriate public education." 99 And although it is unlikely that the EHCA
will be completely repealed in the near future or that the federal
funding of state education will be altered so significantly that state
law will be the only applicable consideration, the current political
climate certainly does not foreclose such a result. Indeed, if the
EHCA is repealed, or if the federal financial aid of state primary
and secondary education is shifted to block grants under the Rehabilitation Act,100 interpretations of state constitutions'O' and statutes as to the right of a profoundly handicapped child to an
education would be decisive. It is unclear how these issues would
be decided if only state law were applied, although Levine may
give an indication.
In the following sections the ramifications of these issues will
be discussed and analyzed.
99. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18).
100. Federal financial support for special education is currently provided through
the EHCA via a formula which bases each state's allocation on the number of
school age children times a percent of the average per pupil expenditure. 20
U.S.C. § 1411 (1976). For a criticism of the formula, see Colley, The Education
for All HandicappedChildren Act (EHA): A Statutory and Legal Analysis,
10 JJL. & EDUC. 137, 144-46 (1981).
If federal financial support for special education were to be provided
through Department of Education block grants, then the regulations under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 would be applicable. 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.1-84.99 (1981). The regulations are much less detailed about education
requirements (45 C.F.R. at § 84.31-84.40), and therefore may possibly provide
less protection.
Those who are atuned to federal government activity note that the elimination of federal education rights for handicapped children through repeal of
the EHCA or its crucial provisions is a clear possibility. R. Martin, HANDIcAP
EDUCAnON LAW NEWS (July, 1982).
101. See listing of state constitutional provisions supra note 47.
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Questions Raised Regarding the Education of Profoundly Retarded
Children
1. Definition of "Education"
a.

The Educationfor All Handicapped Children
ActlO2

Under the EHCA, special education is "specially designed instruction... to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education,
home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 0 3
The related services which have been determined to be necessary
to an appropriate education are "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including
speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical
and occupational therapy, recreation, and [diagnostic and evaluative] medical and counseling services.... as may be required to
assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education
"104

The EHCA does not contain any more explicit definition of education, but it does presume that all handicapped children are "educable.' 0 5 This indicates that the type of educational programming
appropriate to meet the needs of profoundly retarded children
must also be included within the definition of "education."
b. JudicialDecisions
In Levine, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not find a definition of "education" in the New Jersey Constitution, but rather defined it by finding that the purpose of education is to prepare a
child for citizenship and competition in the labor market.106 The
court, however, clearly did state what education is not-it is not
the "care and habilitation which children require for their health
and survival."167 In so holding, the court noted that while care and
habilitation may be education in a philosophical sense, it is not education in a constitutional and legislative sense under the law of
New Jersey.108 Notwithstanding, the Levine court's definition is
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See supra note 9.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976).
Id. at § 1401(17), (18). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1981).
20 U.S.C. § 1401 note (1976) (Congressional Declaration of Purpose § 3(c)).
84 N.J. at 244-49, 418 A.2d at 234-36.
Id. at 250, 418 A.2d at 237.
Id. It should be noted that the New Jersey Standards on Public Institutions
for the Division of Mental Retardation provide that educational services are
"deliberate attempts to facilitate the intellectual sensorimotor, and effective
development of the individual,. . ." and that these services should be "available to all residents, regardless of...
degree of retardation ...." New
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vague inasmuch as the court states that, under state law, trainable
mentally retarded children, who are not considered to be educable
but who can be trained to achieve a degree of independence and
usefulness in society, are constitutionally entitled to "education." 09 Thus, the court seems to say that trainable mentally retarded children are not educable, but that they are entitled to
education. The court implicitly defines education as that which
equips a child to be a citizen. "Training" is included within that
definition, but exactly what training qualifies as "education" is not
specified.
A case illustrating the philosophical disagreement surrounding
the definition of educational rights of profoundly handicapped children is Fialkowski v. Shapp.110 Fialkowski, a case brought under
the United States Constitution rather than the EHCA, defined education functionally, being "assessed in terms of its capacity to
equip a child with the tools needed in life.""' While the court did
not specifically describe what is included within the definition of
education, it did require the public school system to provide "education" to children with the intelligence of two year olds, i.e., chil112
dren with abilities at the level of a profoundly retarded child.
This illustrates the potentially broad meaning of the word,
"education."
3
Finally, in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,"
education was defined to include habilitation. "[Habilitation is]
the term of art used to refer to that education, training and care
required by retarded individuals to reach their maximum
4
development.""
c. Definitions by Educators and Psychologists
Roos, a noted psychologist, has defined education:

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Jersey Standards on Public Institutions, Division of Mental Retardation. It is
noteworthy that the head of the Adaptive Learning Center at Hunterdon
School considered the following activities to fall within the "education program": increasing body control through motor skill development, increasing
awareness through multisensory stimulation, developing self-help skills, developing social and emotional growth, developing receptive and expressive
language, and developing visual and auditory skills. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, Robert G. Guempel at 13-17, Levine v. State of New Jersey, 84 N.J.
234, 418 A.2d 229 (D.N.J. 1980).
84 N.J. at 252-53, 418 A.2d at 238-39 (citing Public School Education Act of 1973,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A.7A-1 et seq. (West 1981)).
405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Id. at 959. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972).
405 F. Supp. at 959.
446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Id. at 1298. See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
afd sub nom, Wyatt v. Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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[Tihe process whereby an individual is helped to develop new behavior or
to apply existing behavior, so as to equip him to cope more effectively with
his total environment [is education]. It should be clear, therefore, that
when we speak of education we do not limit ourselves to the so-called academics. We certainly include the development of basic self-help skills. Indeed, we include those very complex bits of behavior which help to define
an individual as human. We include such skills as toilet training, dressing,
grooming, communicating and so on.115

Like Roos, other experts have included the following self-help
skills within the meaning of education: the ability to appropriately
posture and position one's body, self-feeding, dressing, toilet training, grooming, motor skills, language development, and socialization. 1 6 This kind of education-skill training-is clearly more
expansive than the New Jersey Supreme Court definition of education. The New Jersey Supreme Court rigidly defined education so
as not to include programs other than traditional academic training for citizenship.
2. Definition of "Educability"
The terms "education" and "educability" are related, yet not synonymous. To define "education" does not necessarily resolve the
question of whether a particular individual is "educable." Educa7
ble, by dictionary definition, is the capability of being educated."
8
Education, on the other hand, is the process of educating." It is
the problem of determining those children who are or are not educable that is the subject of this section.119
115. Roos, Current Issues in the Education of Mentally Retarded Persons, PRoCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE ON THE EDUCATION OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS,
2 (W. Cegelka ed., 1971).
116. Luckey & Addison, The Profoundly Retarded: A New Challengefor Public Education, 9 EDUC. & TRAINING OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 123 (1974).
117. FUNK & WAGNALLS DICTIONARY 790 (1947). See also Cuyahoga County Ass'n
for Retarded Children and Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46, 53; Levine v. Institution & Agencies Dep't of New Jersey, 84 N.J. 234, 254, 418 A.2d 229, 239-40.
118. FuNK & WAGNALLS DICTIONARY 790 (1947).
119. The courts in Levine and Cuyahoga County found that mentally retarded
children who fall within the statutory definition of "subtrainable" are uneducable. 84 N.J. at 254, 418 A.2d at 239-40; 411 F. Supp. at 53. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:46-9(c) (West 1981) defines subtrainable children as those who "are so
severely mentally retarded as to be incapable of giving evidence of understanding and responding in a positive manner to simple directions expressed
in the child's primary mode of communication and who cannot in some manner express basic wants and needs."
While the court found these children to be uneducable, they did provide
approximately $310 for them as an educational expense. This raises the curious situation that education is being provided to children who are uneducable. Perhaps what the court intended was that the $310 was being provided
for instruction that is not considered to be "education"; in which case the
question then becomes, why is the school system obligated to pay anything.
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A recent symposium120 evaluated, inter alia, the question of
whether all children are educable. It concluded that when the
functions of education are defined to include such things as the
ability to care for oneself, the ability to avoid detracting from the
health and well being of others, and the ability to make positive
economic and social contributions, rather than being confined to
skills aimed at "jobs, voting, balancing a checkbook, and the
like,"'1 2 1 the term, educable, encompasses more than those students who can profit from the fixed school environment.122 Nevertheless, one group of prominent professionals have recently
challenged the assumption that all handicapped persons are educable. This group, the Partlow Review Committee, 2 3 testified for
the State of Alabama in Wyatt v. Hardin,2 4 arguing that existing
scientific data does not prove conclusively that all retarded individuals can be significantly habilitated.125 The Partlow Committee
further stated that the fact that some residents of institutions had
not made significant progress even after several years of training,
indicated that current habilitation technology is not beneficial to
26
those persons.1
Critics of the Partlow Committee Report note that while current research does not prove that all retarded individuals can be
habilitated, neither does current research prove that certain individuals cannot be habilitated.127 The committee report is also criticized for using the lack of significant progress as the basis for its
argument that certain individuals are not able to be habilitated,
when the reason for lack of progress may be poorly trained person28
nel or other factors.1
This sort of disagreement among professionals concerning the
120.
121.
122.
123.

124.
125.

126.
127.
128.

Symposium, supra note 4.
Hawkins &Hawkins, Symposium, supra note 68, at 15.
Id. at 14-15.
The Partlow Review Committee consisted of authorities in the mental
retardation field and was formed for the purpose of reviewing care, treatment, and training programs in Partlow State School and Hospital and in
other State of Alabama facilities for the mentally retarded.
Motion for Modification, No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala. filed Nov. 20, 1978).
Id.
Favell, Risley, Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitatior How
Can We Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, Symposi rh, supra
note 4, at 37-38.
It could be argued that it may even be harrassment to continue to train
unresponsive profoundly retarded persons, and that at some point lack of response should be the basis for discontinuing heroic and expensive efforts to
"train" these individuals.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39. See also, Kirp, Buss &Kuriloff, Legal Reforms of Special Education:
Empirical Studies and ProceduralProposals,62 CAL L REv. 40 (1974).
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definition of educability is not surprising considering that there is
no currently available program which can produce significant im29
provement in the behavior of all profoundly retarded children.1
Some argue that whether or not a child can benefit from currently
available programs, i.e., whether a child is presently educable, is
determined by evaluating whether there was reasonable progress
after a reasonable period of time in the program. 130 This, of course,
assumes that the programs are operated and administered by
highly trained behavior therapists.131 The determination of educability would also be based upon the public's conception of what
constitutes an education, what skills are meaningful, and what
cost-benefit ratios are acceptable.132 To reiterate, the determination of the educability of a child would first require that the child
be given an opportunity to participate in a program and have his
progress assessed. If no reasonable progress is made, an alternative course of action would become necessary. Succinctly, "educable" would be defined as the ability to learn and maintain
meaningful skills after having been given a reasonable opportunity
to do so. 133
129. Kauffman & Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searchingfor the Substance of
Things Hopedfor; the Evidence of Things Not Seen, SYMposium, supra note 4,
at 53, 55. The high cost of this programming has also been discussed. The
following brings home the economic problem:
Anyone who has worked in the area of mental retardation knows that
resources are severely limited.... In a tight economy such as ours,
priorities must be set; and before long I believe that the taxpayers
will want to know what the costs vs. benefits are for 'training' the
unresponsive profoundly retarded. They may well demand that such
scarce resources be spent on clients more likely to benefit. What will
they say if we report that it costs $5,000 to produce 10-sec of eye-contact or $25,000 to teach a client to raise his arm? Basic custodial care
in state run facilities is costing $15-20,000 per client per year (1980
dollars). Any kind of sophisticated training is likely to triple this
figure, and we still do not know what the benefits will be.
Bailey, Wanted: A Rational Searchfor the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, SYMposium, supra note 4, at 50. See also Baumeister,
The Right to Habilitation: What Does It Mean? SyMposim, supra note 4, at
61, 69-70.
130. Kauffman & Krouse, supra note 129, at 55.
131. Kauffman & Krouse, supra note 129. The proponents of this determination
believe that all of those terms (appropriate effort, highly trained, reasonable
period, significant progress, and meaningful skill) could be operationally defined. Id. This approach is mentioned by others. Baumeister, The Right to
Habilitation: What Does It Mean? Symposim, supra note 4, at 61, 67-68. Periodic reevaluations of these "untrainable" individuals would be the safeguard for those determined to be untrainable. Id.
132. Kauffman & Krouse, supra note 129, at 56.
133. Id.
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a. The Policy Question
One psychologist, Ellis, argues that the question to be answered is not whether an individual is "trainable," but whether the
skill that is to be taught is useful, and whether the individual can
"learn [the] skills well enough to use it ... in a reasonable
amount of time [with reasonable] effort."134 It is highly doubtful

that current teaching techniques are adequate to meet the training
needs of profoundly retarded children. Most elementary and secondary teachers are trained to "present material"; they are not
generally asked to determine how and why people learn. The average child and even the mildly mentally retarded child can learn
from having material "presented," but the profoundly retarded
child is extremely unlikely to do so. The problem, then, is cyclical:
Appropriate teaching techniques for the profoundly retarded will
not be developed until much more effort is put into learning how to
teach the profoundly retarded, and more effort to learn how to
teach these children will not be made until their worth, needs, and
abilities are fully appreciated. Indeed, even if the previously mentioned standard for determining educability is adopted, i.e., if after
reasonable effort through an appropriate program there is no significant progress,135 it is possible that appropriate training programs would never be developed. As a result, profoundly retarded
children will be labeled as uneducable based upon currently available techniques rather than on appropriatetechniques.
Unless the law creates the pressure to provide education or
training to severely and profoundly retarded children, it is quite
likely that appropriate teaching techniques will not be developed.
This point is made by Flexer and Martin who note that until the
attitude toward the severely retarded child changed, there was a
time or money in developlack of motivation to invest substantial
36
ing effective training strategies.1
There is evolving from recent research a training technology specifically
aimed at those persons who not very long ago were classified as "too severely handicapped to have any rehabilitation potential." One of the factors which has facilitated this growth is an attitude change, which ... [in
part] means that instead of saying, 'These people (the severely handicapped) cannot learn and cannot be trained," we are now saying, "We
to teach. The failing is not with the sehave not been competent enough 137
verely handicapped, but with us."

Likewise, it would be undesirable for the progress which has
134. Ellis, On Trainingthe Mentally Retarded, SYMPOSmM, supra note 4, at 99, 107.
135. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
136. Flexer & Martin, Sheltered Workshops in Vocational and Training Settings,
SYSTEMATIC INSTRUCTION OF THE MODERATELY AND SEVERELY HANDICAPPED

421 (1978).
137. Id.
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been made to be lost simply because of a failure to appreciate the
issues. Hopefully, most courts, educators, and psychologists
would define education more broadly than did the Levine court,
and include non-academic type training of self-help skills within
the concept. This broader definition, and a philosophy that, with
the development of appropriate educational technology, severely
and profoundly retarded children are educable, 138 provide an appropriate starting point from which to evaluate the social policy
question of which educational rights the law should provide profoundly handicapped children. But the real policy question which
must be faced, in deciding whether to legislatively mandate the
motivation to develop appropriate techniques to educate or to train
severely and profoundly handicapped children, is a question of
money. Are the large financial commitments per child which are
necessary in order to educate these children desirable or necessary? This author certainly believes they are. But if Congress and
our legislatures decide that certain children do not have a right to
education, the focus must then be placed on the process of
exclusion.
3. Processfor Determining Whether an Individual Is Educable
a. Due Process Generally
If certain individuals are to be classified as uneducable, and
thereby, denied the benefits of the school system, the process for
making that decision must be fair. Several procedural questions
immediately arise: Who will make that decision? When will that
decision be made? What kind of evidence will be required? Who
will bear the burden of proving educability? What safeguards
should be provided to ensure that periodic reevaluations are made
as teaching technology improves? And what standards of judicial
review should be established? The difficulties inherent in these
questions can be illustrated by examining them in relation to provisions in the EHCA.
The EHCA provides a mechanism to ensure that a free appropriate public education is made available to all handicapped children.139 First, the states must establish priorities for providing
education to even the most severely handicapped children.140 The
states must then establish procedural safeguards as required
under the EHCA.141 Among the procedural rights required include, the right of the child or his representative "to present com138.
139.
140.
141.

This is the view in the EHCA. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2) (B) (1976).
Id. at § 1412(3).
Id. at § 1412(5).
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plaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision
of a free appropriate public education to such child."142 Written
prior notice to the parents or guardian of a child must be provided
whenever the state educational agency proposes to initiate a
change or refuses to initiate a change in regard to the education of
a child protected by the EHCA.143 Whenever a complaint is made
under the EHCA, the parents or guardian "shall have an opportudue process hearing,"144 from which an appeal
nity for an impartial
5
may be taken.14
After considering this procedural framework for educational
placement of handicapped children, the question at hand must
again be faced: what process should be required if certain handicapped children are to be totally excluded from the educational
process because they are uneducable. Although the EHCA process is satisfactory as far as it goes, a number of problems would
be encountered if it were merely carried over and applied in cases
of total exclusion from education.
The first problem in merely adopting the EHCA process is that
certain safeguards which may be applicable to placement, are
either inadequate or unnecessary in regard to questions of uneducability. An example of this situation involves the delay associated with appealing from a placement decision. The federal
regulations require that each state's compliance plan' 4 6 provide
that within 45 days after receipt of a request for a hearing by a
public agency a final decision be reached, 47 and that if this decision is appealed to the state educational agency, the state agency
shall make its final decision within 30 days. 46 An appeal from the
state educational agency's decision may be taken to the state or
federal courts. 49 If the time delay due to the initial placement proceedings' 50 is added, and if no sanction is levied against the state
for failure to comply with the regulations cited above,151 it be142. Id. at § 1415(b) (1) (E) (emphasis added).
143. Id. at § 1415(b) (1)(c).

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at § 1415(b) (2).
Id. at § 1415(e) (1).
Id. at § 1412(2).
34 C.F.L § 300.512(a) (1981).
Id. at § 300.512(b).
Id. at § 300.511.
Id. at § 300.504.
See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. There is, of course, the sanction that federal funds may be withdrawn. Note that during these proceedings, the child is to remain in the existing educational setting, unless the
parents and public agency agree otherwise. If the proceedings involve the
initial placement, and the parents consent, the child must be placed in the
regular public school program. 34 C.F.L § 300.513 (1981).
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comes obvious that a great period of time may elapse before an
ultimate decision is reached. This may not be avoidable or detrimental in the placement context because the child remains in the
educational setting, 152 but where the child is to be excluded from
the educational system altogether, additional, explicit safeguards
seem warranted.
The second problem involves the economics of due process.
Under the EHCA, the parents have a right "to examine all relevant
records"153 regarding their child's education and obtain copies at a
reasonable cost. 5 4 Additionally, the parents have a conditional
right to an independent educational evaluation of their child at
public expense if they disagree with the public agency's evaluation.155 But the EHCA does not provide for the parents' attorney's
fees or other costs to be paid even when a placement
decision by
56
the state has been challenged successfully.1
In most instances it is in the interest of the parents to have an
attorney or trained lay advocate present even at impartial hearings, 5 7 and unless there is an advocate available at no cost
through legal aid or some other program, this can be a costly option. Moreover, there are many cases in which expert witnesses,
such as psychiatrists, psychologists, and therapists, are necessary,
or at least helpful, in presenting the parents' case. When dealing
with such complex questions as whether a particular child is "educable," this is almost certain to be true. Unless these witnesses
can be obtained at no charge, this can be another particularly
costly item. Whether these costs must be borne by the state seems
to be a matter of legislative prerogative when placement decisions
are made under the EHCA, but the same prerogative may not exist
when the right to any education at all is at stake. 5 8 Such is the
152.
153.
154.
155.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (1981).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.502, 300.562 (1981).
34 C.F.R. § 300.566(a) (1981).
Id. at, § 300.503. The parent still has a right to an independent evaluation if
the hearing results in a finding that the first evaluation was appropriate, but
the second evaluation is not to be paid for at public expense. Id. at
§ 300.503(b).
156. The public agency only has an obligation to inform the parent of available
free or low-cost legal counsel. Id. at § 300.506(c).
157. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2) (1976).
158. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (state law conditioning judicial
decree of divorce upon claimant's ability to pay court fees and cost held unconstitutional as denial of access to judicial proceeding which was the exclusive means of resolving the dispute); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(state statute requiring the payment of fees to acquire transcript and court
records necessary for full appellate review found violative of equal protection
as denial of access to appeal).
See also text accompanying note 97, supra.
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case when educability is being determined.
A third problem which should warrant different procedural
treatment when the issue is educability, rather than placement, is
the necessary professional expertise of the hearing officer. The
EHCA requires the hearing officer to be impartial, 5 9 but there are
no specific guidelines as to the expertise this person must possess.
Perhaps the hearing officer should be viewed no differently than a
judge who is called upon to make difficult decisions about technical areas of the law, such as medical malpractice, tax, and patent
law, in which he has little expertise. But to do so ignores the reality of the situation. Hearing officers do not serve the same function
as a judge. They should be experts in their own right, if only to be
able to determine which side's expert witnesses should carry the
day in the battle of philosophies and credentials.
A proposal to lessen this problem is to institute a hearing panel
to make these decisions.160 The panel would be composed of an
educator, a psychologist or psychiatrist, and a lay person. This
composition has the virtue of being able to take into consideration
a broader range of values and ideas in determining something so
amorphous as educability.
b. Evidence of Uneducabilityand the Burden of Proof
There is no general rule regarding which party in a particular
matter bears the burden of proof. The burden is usually placed on
the party who is presumed to have the "peculiar means of knowledge enabling him to prove its falsity if it is false."61 There is a
tendency to place the burden on the party desiring change. 62 Applying these rules to the situation in which a school system is asserting that a child is uneducable, it is not clear which party should
bear the burden of proof. There would probably be a strong argument, however, that the school would be the party presumed to
have facts peculiarly within its knowledge, i.e., access to school
records, school psychologists, and special educators. It is also arguable that the presumption should be that all children are educable,163 and that the party desiring the change, the school, should
bear the burden.
The more difficult question is what type of evidence must be
introduced to prove the uneducability of a particular child. Bricker
has suggested that the quantum and quality of evidence necessary
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

34 C.F.R. § 300.507 (1981).
Cf. 34 C.F.R § 300.650 (1981) (state advisory panel).
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1978).
McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337, at 785 (2d ed. 1972).
See supra note 73 and accompanying text. See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b)
(1981) (burden is on public agency to show evaluation is appropriate).
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to prove that a child is uneducable should require showing "the
failure of a perfectly valid, perfectly reliable, perfectly efficient program of training... ."164 Of course, this burden of proof would
essentially mean that no one could be determined to be uneducable because there is no such thing as perfectly valid, perfectly
reliable, perfectly efficient program of training. A more reasonable
standard might be that if a generally accepted program of training
had been implemented by appropriately trained personnel for a
reasonable amount of time, with no resulting progress, the child
could be defined as uneducable.165 Still, considering the complexity and controversial nature of educational psychology and methodology, it is likely that no consensus could be reached as to what
training programs are appropriate, what personnel are appropriately trained, what constitutes a reasonable amount of time, and
what indicates a lack of progress. Litigation could be expected on
these matters, which are166currently the subjects of extensive research and development.
c.

Processfor Reevaluation

Under the EHCA, the states are charged with providing individualized educational programs (IEP) for "each handicapped child
. ..-167

The regulations require that each handicapped child's

TEP be reviewed at least every three years, and more frequently if
necessary, or if requested by either the school or the parents.168
164. Favell, Risley, Wolfe, Riddle, &Rasmussen, supra note 125, at 39; Baumeister,
supra note 129, at 68.
165. See supra notes 130, 135 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Guess, Sailor, Keogh & Baer, Language Development Programsfor
Severely HandicappedChildren, 1 TEACHING THE SEVERELY HANDICAPPED 301
(1976).
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(4).
An IEP is defined in the EHCA as
a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any
meeting by a representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the
unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or
guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which
statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals,
including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the
specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated
duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and
evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an
annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.340 (1981).
168. 34 C.F.R. § 300.534 (1981).
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Likewise, it would seem clear that a procedure for periodic reevaluation of the educability of a child should be provided. The
need for reevaluation is even more urgent when the issue is educability, than where appropriate programming is the question, because the child who is placed in a program is receiving some
educational services (even though they may later be determined to
be inappropriate), while the uneducable child is being denied educational services altogether.
Given the changes in teaching techniques and methodology
that are bound to result from ongoing research, 169 it would seem
that frequent reevaluation must be an explicit requirement in the
procedural safeguards established for determining whether a child
is educable.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the differences of opinion among psychologists, educators, and other experts about the educability of profoundly retarded individuals,170 and the high cost of providing education to
this segment of the population,171 it seems clear that a careful reexamination of the issue of education of the profoundly retarded is
necessary at this time. If significant resources are to be directed to
172
it is
this effort to the detriment of other handicapped students,
possible that a backlash might result from taxpayers who feel that
analysis, money for special education
on the basis of a cost-benefit
73
is being unwisely spent.
This Article was not intended to decide whether certain individ169. See generally Lindsley, Direct Measurement & Prosthesis of Retarded Children, 147 J. EDUC. 62-81 (1964).
170. See discussion in text at sections TV(B) (1) (c) and 1V(B) (2) supra.
171. Bailey, Wanted A Rational Searchfor the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, Symposrum, supra note 4, at 50.
172. Judge Waddy in the case of Mills v. Board of Educ. of the District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) addressed the defense frequently raised by
school districts that they lack sufficient funds to pay for special education. "If
sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs
that are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be
expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from
a publicly supported education... ." Id. at 876. The lack of adequate funds
under the EHCA to meet all of its mandates (particularly with respect to educating profoundly retarded) has been raised before Congress and in administrative rule-making proceedings, but little has been done to respond to this
concern. Hearings on the Implementation of the Educationfor All Handicapped ChildrenAct Before the Subcomm. on the Handicappedof the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59, 60, 69, 78,419,485 (1977);
Hearingson the Educationfor All HandicappedChildren Act Before the Subcomm. on Select Educationof the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 29, 33, 63, 70, 82-83, 110 (1977).
173. See Bailey, supra note 171, at 50.
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uals are educable or not; whether the EHCA, as it exists, adequately addresses this conundrum; or whether a change in the
existing law is necessary. What was intended was to point out that
the process of educating profoundly retarded individuals was not
74
carefully analyzed at any point during congressional debate
of
175
the EHCA or in the implementation of the regulations.
What should be done at this point is to urge Congress and the
Department of Education to reexamine this issue. In reevaluating
174. In the hearings that led up to the passage of the ECHA there were over 200
presentations by witnesses, prepared statements, and other written submissions. Of these only a handful mentioned providing education to the profoundly retarded and multiply-handicapped. See Hearingson S. 6 Before the
Subcomm. on the Handicappedof the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 30 (1973-1974) (statement of Mrs. Patricia Juliano) (inadequacy of programming for her multi-handicapped children); id. at
25 (statement of Mrs. Mildred Ricci) (unavailability of education for her
handicapped child); id. at 34 (statement of Mrs. Jean Hatt) (unfamiliarity of
school districts with severely retarded children); id. at 45 (statement of Paul
Crawford) (lack of educational opportunity for severely and profoundly retarded); id. at 50 (statement of Robert Stearns, Member, Montgomery (Maryland) County Association for Retarded Citizens) (severely and profoundly
handicapped can benefit from education and have long been overlooked); id.
at 313-18 (Testimony of Phillip A. Bellefleur, Headmaster, Pennsylvania
School for the Deaf) (complexity of providing education to the multiply
handicapped); id. at 395 (statement of Mrs. Barbara Cutler, Past President of
the Association for Mentally l Children in Massachusetts) (recognition of
inclusion of very handicapped children in the public school system); id. at 443
(statement of Ben E. Hoffmeyer, Executive Director of the American School
for the Deaf) (complexity of educating the multiply handicapped); id. at 706
(statement of Dr. Oliver L. Hurley, Associate Professor of Special Education,
University of Georgia) (exclusion of severely or profoundly handicapped
children from public schools); id. at 793 (statement of Mrs. Christine Griffith)
(exclusion of her autistic child from public education); id. at 822 (statement
of Landis Stetler, Florida State Administrator, Education for Exceptional
Children) (need to provide programs to severely handicapped); id. at 1199
(Testimony of John C. Groos, Director of Special Education, Minnesota Department of Education) (resource demands of severely handicapped not adequately met, particularly in rural areas); id. at 2151 (Comment by National
Schools Boards Association) (some severely disabled children cannot benefit
from certain services); id. at 1442 (statement of John C. Pittenger, Secretary
of Education, Pennsylvania) (profoundly retarded children receiving inadequate education); id. at 1453 (statement of Donald M. Carroll, Jr., Deputy Secretary & Commissioner for Basic Education, Pennsylvania, Department of
Education) (recognizing gradations in educability of retarded children); id.
at 1490 (statement of Peter Polloni, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens) (lack of programs for severely and profoundly
retarded); id at 1540 (statement of Ellen Somerton, Coordinator, Right to Education Program) (progress of severely retarded after receiving self-help
skills training); id. at 1657 (Article submitted by David Kirp, William Buss,
and Peter Kuriloff) (exclusion of severely handicapped children from public
schools).
175. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.754 (1981).
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the EHCA, great attention should be paid to resolving the following issues:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

What is the definition of "education" within the EHCA?
Are certain children "uneducable" or can "all handicapped children"
be educated?
If certain children can be determined to be "uneducable," what process will be used? What safeguards need to be provided to insure a
fair decision?
If education for profoundly handicapped children is to be provided at
public expense,
how should the costs of residential placement be
176
allocated?

During this reexamination, congressional committees and regional administrative hearing committees should make every effort to obtain public comment.177 This important ingredient in the
legislative process has sometimes been forgotten. For example, a
recent survey of the development of special education law concludes that while the initial political work to secure passage of the
EHCA was done primarily by handicapped individuals themselves, 178 most recent activity has come from professional organizations directed by university-based professionals receiving
federal financial support in the form of grants.179 With increasing
frequency, these self-interested professionals, including educators,
psychologists, and lawyers, have begun to operate independently
of citizen groups,180 advocating positions regardless of differences
of opinion with the citizen groups. The result has been the
following:
With dramatic increases in the influence of both lawyers and applied behavioral psychologists, consumer advocacy groups have been overwhelmed by the rapid changes that are occurring in the development of
176. In addressing the costs involved in educating profoundly retarded children,
attention should be focused on the fact that institutionalizing a person over a
lifetime can be far more costly than providing "education" (training for selfhelp skills) which may initially be expensive, but which is in the long run less
expensive because individuals receiving this training will ultimately require
less custodial care. This cost-benefit ,consideration has been recognized in
Congressional hearings on the EHCA. See, e.g., Hearingson S. 6 Before the
Subcomm. on the Handicappedof the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 21 (1973-1974) (statement of Senator Harrison
A. Williams, Jr.); id. at 1540 (statement of Ellen Somerton, Coordinator, Right
to Education Progran in Pennsylyania); SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC
WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SEss.; REPORT ON EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT 8 (Comm. Print 1975).
177. Townsend & Mattson, The Interactionof Law and Special Education,Syi'osain, supra note 4, at 77-78. For a discussion of the means of obtaining consumer input in federal government decision-making, see Rothstein,
Presentationof the Consumer Viewpoint in FederalAdministrative Proceedings: What's the Best Alternative?,41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 565 (1980).
178. Townsend & Mattson, supra note 177, at 77-78.
179. Id. at 79.
180. Id. at 80-81.
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public policies regarding handicapped individuals. To cope with the volume of information that is being produced in the field, consumer advocacy
groups have often hired special education professionals to direct their organizations. Consequently, consumer groups have been given little information which would allow them to develop a critical perspective on the
activities of professionals in the field. Rather thar leading the movement,
consumer groups have been increasingly swept along by the stream of
events impressed by the magnitude of change that seems to be
occurring. 1 8 1

The point is, that while professionals should be included in assessing the adequacy of the EHCA and its regulations, attention
should also be given to parents and citizen advocacy groups. Both
the professionals and the citizen groups should fully identify the
sources of information they use as the basis for their opinions.
The availability of many sources of information will illuminate the
complexity of the issues; it is then that these complex issues will
be dealt with appropriately.
In conclusion, this Article has answered fewer questions than it
has raised. The issues have been unsettled and unanalyzed for
some time, but with cases like Levine, they are being brought to
light. The mentally handicapped are one of the minorities least
able to assert their rights and advocate their position. The profoundly handicapped are clearly the least able of the least able.
For this reason, great care must be taken in deciding whether education is to be provided at all, and if it is not to be provided, which
safeguards of due process must be ensured. Decision makers
should consider the viewpoints of all interested parties in making
these important policy determinations.

181. Id. at 80-81. It is important in evaluating testimony that appropriate consideration be given to whether an opinion is based on personal experience and
observation or on objective testing and analysis.

